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ABSTRACT
Health care is attacked in many contemporary conflicts despite the Geneva 
Conventions. The war in Syria has become notorious for targeted violence 
against health care. This qualitative study describes health care workers’ experi-
ences of violence using semi-structured interviews (n = 25) with professionals 
who have been working in Syria. The participants were selected using a snow-
ball sampling method and interviewed in Turkey and Europe between 2016– 
2017. Analysis was conducted using content analysis. Results revealed that the 
most destructive and horrific forms of violence health care workers have 
experienced were committed mostly by the Government of Syria and the 
Islamic State. Non-state armed groups and Kurdish Forces have also committed 
acts of violence against health care, though their scope and scale were con-
sidered to have a lower mortality. The nature of violence has evolved during the 
conflict: starting from verbal threats and eventually leading to hospital bomb-
ings. Health care workers were not only providers of health care to injured 
demonstrators, they also participated in non- violent anti-government actions. 
The international community has not taken action to protect health care in 
Syria. For health workers finding safe environments in which to deliver health 
care has been impossible.
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1. Introduction
The Geneva Conventions obligate all parties in the time of war to respect the 
neutrality of health care. Combatants are required to differentiate between 
military and civilian objects. Medical professionals may not be punished for 
treating those in need of help (ICRC 1949, 1977). Despite legal protections, 
health care has been targeted in many armed conflicts (Briody et al. 2018; 
CONTACT Agneta Kallström agneta.kallstrom@helsinki.fi
MEDICINE, CONFLICT AND SURVIVAL                 
2021, VOL. 37, NO. 1, 34–54 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2021.1889654
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- 
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, 
transformed, or built upon in any way.
Druce et al. 2019; Rubenstein and Bittle 2010; Footer et al. 2014; Lafta and 
Falah 2019; The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition 2020).
In 2019, attacks against health care were reported in 20 conflict-affected 
countries. The attacks left 151 health care workers (HCWs) dead. Forms of 
violence ranged from verbal threats to executions and hospital bombings. 
Many of the reported attacks took place in Syria (The Safeguarding Health in 
Conflict Coalition 2020). At the time of writing, the Syrian war has continued 
for almost a decade and hospital bombings have become a tragic character-
istic of the conflict.
The Government of Syria (GoS) and the Government of Russia (GoR) are 
considered to be responsible for the majority of the deaths (91%) of HCWs. 
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have contributed to the violence to a lesser 
extent. Over half of the deaths of HWCs were caused by airstrikes and artillery 
fire. Other identified causes include small arms fire, torture, and executions 
(Fouad et al. 2018; Physicians for Human Rights 2019).
The estimated number of HCWs killed between 2011 and March 2020 
exceeds 923 persons. In addition, more than 350 health care facilities have 
been attacked (Physicians for Human Rights 2019). These attacks have taken 
place mostly in NSAG-controlled areas. Roughly half of the hospitals, espe-
cially those providing trauma care, were targeted by air strikes – some of 
them multiple times (Elamein et al. 2017a). By the end of 2019, 25% of public 
hospitals were reported to be partially functioning and 25% as non- 
functioning (WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean 2019). The 
majority of qualified HCWs had left the country (Fouad et al. 2018; Physicians 
for Human Rights 2020). Those HCWs who have stayed in Syria are operating 
in challenging environments risking their health and psychological well- 
being (Footer et al. 2018; Fardousi, Douedari, and Howard 2019; Blanchet 
et al. 2016; Fouad et al. 2018).
Some of the violence against health care appears to have been intention-
ally targeted. This has raised concerns. In May 2016, the UN Security Council 
condemned attacks against medical facilities and personnel in the time of 
conflict (Security Council 2016). It has become increasingly vital to under-
stand the context, motives, and dynamics of what may be intentional attacks 
against health care. This applies particularly to the Syrian conflict where 
health care has been repeatedly and according to Fouad et al. (2018) and 
others intentionally attacked.
Conducting research in conflict settings is challenging for various reasons. 
These include practical difficulties, including bias in data collection, lack of 
funding, applicable research methods and terminology (Cohen and Tamar 
2011; Patel et al. 2017). A significant knowledge gap exists regarding the 
nature and extent of violence against health care that appears to be targeted 
and its impact on HCWs (World Health Organization 2016a). In Syria, research 
regarding violence against health care, including that which appears to be 
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targeted has focused on airstrikes against facilities and ambulances. Also the 
majority of data collected is quantitative.1 High-profile attacks, such as hos-
pital bombings, gain attention while less destructive and fatal acts, such as 
threats against HCWs, may go underreported. Only a few qualitative and 
descriptive studies about HCW experiences in the midst of war exist.2 
However, qualified HCWs play a crucial role in delivering medical assistance 
for those in need. Without their contribution, the public health system would 
collapse.
In this research, we describe violence against health care from the perspec-
tive of HCWs working in Syria during – at the time of writing – the ongoing 
conflict. We explore what they have witnessed since the conflict began, their 
experiences and their thoughts about the different warring parties and their 
acts of violence. We also study how the changing nature of the conflict has 
influenced the different forms of violence against HCWs. We don’t regard HCWs 
only as passive subjects of violence, as many of them have had an active role in 
opposing the President and the Government of Syria. The political role of HCWs 
during the conflict, especially in the early years, will also be discussed.
2. Methods
This qualitative study is based on semi-structured interviews of 25, mostly Syrian, 
HCWs who worked in Syria after the conflict started in 2011. From June 2016 to 
December 2017, 18 interviews were conducted near the Syrian border in 
Gaziantep, Turkey. In addition to this, 7 interviews were conducted in Europe.
2.1 Setting
In spring 2011, demonstrations were held against President al-Assad and the 
Baath party who have held power in Syria since 1963. The GoS can be described as 
authoritarian and is known for practicing discrimination, torture, and extrajudicial 
killings (Ziadeh 2013). As unrest spread from the southern city of Daraa across the 
country, the GoS responded with force. Violence escalated gradually into an 
armed conflict. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) opposition group was established. 
We consider this as a starting point of the war. Meanwhile groups with an Islamic 
background, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN),3 were gaining power and recruiting 
fighters in Northern Syria (Lister 2015, p. 83–116).
In spring 2013, a Salafi jihadist organization, Islamic State (IS), emerged in 
Syria. The organization focused its actions on the northern city of Raqqa and the 
governorate of Deir ez-Zour. After capturing the city of Mosul in Iraq, IS declared 
itself a caliphate in north-eastern Syria and western Iraq. In the same year, 2014, 
the Global Coalition Against Daesh4 led by the United States (US) began air-
strikes against IS with the aim of defeating them (The Global Coalition against 
Daesh 2020). In 2015 the GoR entered the conflict on the side of the GoS. 
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According to Russia’s Ministry of the Defence, the aim was to target terrorist 
organizations such as IS and JaN (RT Question More 2015). In March 2016, the 
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) established the Autonomous 
Administration of North and East Syria (NES), also known as Rojava.
The majority of interviews were conducted in mid-2016 when Syria was 
geographically fragmented between four main factions:
(1) The GoS. The Syrian Arab Armed Forces, the armed forces of the Syrian 
Arab Republic, allied with the GoR. The GoS has also recruited para-
militaries and made pacts with Iranian ground forces and foreign 
Shi’ite militias (Heller 2016). The term shabihas is used in this article 
to refer to members of pro-government militias.
(2) NSAGs. Here the term NSAGs is used to refer to a heterogeneous group of 
organizations from nationalist FSA fighters and moderate Islamist groups 
to al-Qaeda-aligned jihadists, such as the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). 
These groups fight against the GoS and some practice military co- 
operation, although some of them also fight against each other (Heller 
2016).
(3) IS. IS is known as the Salafi jihadist organization and its atrocities 
against civilians are well known. IS is fighting against all parties in the 
conflict (Heller 2016; Stern and Berger 2015).
(4) The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). SDF is an umbrella term used to refer 
to several armed groups. SDF is dominated by the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) and its civilian parallel, Democratic Union Party 
(PYD). These groups are linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The 
coalition is backed by the US to fight against IS. SDF is mainly fighting 
against IS and occasionally the GoS (Heller 2016; Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program UCDP 2015). In this study, we refer to this group as the Kurdish 
Forces.
Additionally, the Global Coalition against Daesh has participated in the conflict. 
The US-led coalition includes 83 countries and was formed in September 2014 to 
defeat IS in Syria and Iraq (The Global Coalition against Daesh 2020).
At the time of writing at the end of the 2020, NSAG-controlled Idlib was the 
last true stronghold out of GoS control. Also, IS had lost all territories they 
controlled. In March 2019, the US Administration announced the defeat of IS 
in Syria and Iraq (The Global Coalition against Daesh 2020).
2.2 Study population
Most of the interviews (n = 18) were conducted in Gaziantep, a Turkish 
municipality adjacent to the Syrian border. Interviewing participants in Syria 
was impossible for security reasons.
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Many of those interviewed in Gaziantep lived in Turkey but travelled to Syria 
regularly to work for different international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) or local organizations the majority of which operated in Aleppo governor-
ate. They typically visited Syria monthly and the duration of their visits ranged 
from a few days to several weeks.
Those participants who were interviewed in Europe (n = 7) had worked as 
HCWs in Syria during the conflict. This group consisted of Western expatriates 
and Syrians with refugee or student status or with a visiting visa.
Participants consisted of 21 males and 4 females. Their ages ranged from 
26 to 69 years; the median age was 32 years. Of the Syrian participants 
(n = 23), about half (n = 12) were born in Aleppo governorate. The other 
half originated from a variety of other Syrian governorates. One was born 
abroad in another Middle Eastern country. We reached no interviewees from 
the governorates of Suwayda, Qunteira, Tartus or Hasakah.
Most of the participants were physicians (n = 17). The amount of pre-war 
health care work experience varied from almost none to 43 years. The 
demographic characteristics of the interviewees are summarized in Table 1.
2.3 Data collection
One female and two male researchers collected semi-structured interview 
data. Nineteen interviews were conducted in English and six in Arabic.
Table 1. Interviewees’ demographic information.
Demographics Number
Interviews 25
















Abroad (Middle East) 1
Profession
physicians with a speciality 11




health service managers 2
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The open-ended questions were designed to meet two core research goals:
(1) Identify and describe violence, particularly targeted violence as experi-
enced by HCWs in Syria.
(2) Identify the perpetrators responsible and/or involved in the violence.
The participants were recruited using a snowball sampling method (SSM). We 
chose this method because it enables the identification of individuals who 
avoid publicity or are otherwise hard to find (Atkinson and Flint 2001). The 
participants required for this research tended to avoid attention due to the 
sensitive political nature of the topic and the related threat of violence. Only 
those with an occupation represented in the World Health Organizations’ 
(WHO) classification of the health workforce were included in the study (The 
World Health Organization n.d.).
The starting point of the first SSM chain was a HCW in Gaziantep, Turkey. 
This first participant indicated three further possible contacts. Another two 
SSM chains started in Europe. All three chains developed separately accumu-
lating unrelated interviewees. The interviews continued as long as the parti-
cipants were able to provide new information.
2.4 Data analysis
In this study ‘violence’ was defined according to the World Health Organization 
as: The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against 
oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or 
has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldeve-
lopment or deprivation (World Health Organization 2002).
Qualitative content analysis was applied using an inductive approach. The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim. Transliteration coding was then per-
formed and themes relevant to the study were identified. These themes 
were used to categorize the information present in the interviews and classify 
the events. The following classification parameters were used: time of attack, 
object (i.e. type of target), type of attack, assumed perpetrators, place of the 
incident and results of the attack (see appendix I). The timeline of the violence 
ranged from before the conflict started in spring 2011 to December 2017.
Only cases where the interviewee or a colleague of theirs had been present 
were included. Cases were entered in an Excel chart and further analysed by 
identifying commonalities and differences resulting from the narrative. Even 
if not all necessary data were present, the descriptions were classified accord-
ing to the assumed perpetrator and if necessary the estimated time of 
occurrence to try and understand the nature of the violence and identify 
possible patterns and underlying strategies.
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One of the main purposes of this study was to identify potentially significant 
qualitative phenomena. Therefore, all interview findings deemed important or 
interesting by the authors were included in the results regardless of whether they 
were brought up by multiple interviewees or just one person.
In this article quotations are used to provide evidence and to further illustrate 
the experiences of the participants. The language in italics has not been corrected 
in order to preserve its original tone and authenticity. In some cases, details such 
as names or places have been omitted to protect the participants’ identities.
2.5 Research ethics
The interviews were recorded with permission from the participants. We 
elicited no names or any other personal information that could be used to 
identify the interviewees. We obtained the consent to participate verbally. 
Participants were informed about the research and its aims and purposes.
An ethical permit for the study was obtained from the University of Eastern 
Finland’s Committee on Research Ethics.
3. Results
In the results section we first describe the conditions of Syrian health care workers 
before 2011 and the escalation of the conflict. Then we proceed to investigate the 
actions of the GoS against health care at each point of time. Next, we explore the 
role of other significant factions in the violence. Finally, we describe health care 
workers’ own political role during the conflict.
3.1 The Syrian society before conflict
The participants described how HCWs, especially physicians, were respected 
in Syrian society before the conflict. They did not experience state-based 
violence due to their profession. However, as citizens, they were subjected to 
violence by the GoS.
The majority of Syrians was [experiencing] violence, physical and psycholo-
gical threats. But as a doctor, there was no violence against me. But as a human, 
as a Syrian, there was violence. (participant 3)
The participants described the problems of society, such as corruption and 
discrimination. Human rights, especially freedom of speech, were severely 
restricted and challenging authority was considered risky. Some of the parti-
cipants had been detained and abused for expressing anti-state opinions and 
taking part in political activism, such as human rights activism. Some thought 
that abiding by the rules allowed one to avoid consequences from the 
system. For a submissive citizen, many participants considered Syria to be 
a relatively good place to live.
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Don’t question anything, just do your normal life, your daily work. Don’t ask why 
there is corruption, the institutions, why there is bribery, why this is not working, why 
they arrested this guy . . . Just eat, sleep, buy . . . (participant 5)
3.2 Perpetrators and forms of violence
Nearly half of the interviewees had personally experienced direct physical 
violence after 2011, some of them multiple times. Some had experienced 
violence from several different perpetrators.
According to the interviewees, all four main factions had committed violence. 
All participants mentioned the GoS as a perpetrator. Half of the interviewees 
named IS as responsible for violence, while less than half of the interviewees 
indicated NSAGs. In some cases, particular NSAGs like FSA, and radical Islamist 
groups were named. Kurdish forces were mentioned a few times.
Violence is happening everywhere inside Syria. You see airstrikes and ISIS on 
the ground, even some FSA is performing sometimes bad behaviour against 
medical staff. There are very good people inside FSA, but they are still armed 
group. Everyone inside Syria is practicing violence. (participant 21)
Those interviewees who had become victims of direct physical violence 
had been beaten, arrested, imprisoned or tortured or they had been in an 
ambulance or a health care facility when it was assaulted. They also described 
the experiences of colleagues that they had heard about or even witnessed. 
Their colleagues had been arrested, detained, tortured, killed or assaulted 
while in a health care facility.
Fortunately, I was not in this time in the hospital. But I came to the hospital [after 
air strike] and saw, that some of our friends, colleagues being killed. (participant 22)
3.3 Targeted violence against health care by the government of Syria
3.3.1 Health care workers
According to some participants, intentional violence against health care started 
simultaneously with the unrest that spread across Syria in 2011–2012. Even 
though the GoS was known for its extensive use of force, some participants 
had not anticipated such violence.
[Colleagues] were arrested. We couldn’t imagine that they would be killed. It 
happened in early 2012. In Aleppo there was not much violence, only some 
gunshots and people run away. Then the regime [the GoS] catch some people 
and keeps them inside the jail for a month, three months, six months and they go 
out. But after [colleagues having been arrested and then killed] we knew the 
regime [the GoS] is targeting health workers. (participant 22)
Before some health care workers fled from the GoS-controlled areas into 
FSA-controlled areas, security forces of the GoS had a strong presence at 
government locations, including hospitals. Members of pro-government 
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militias, shabihas, were monitoring HCWs. Shabihas questioned the HCWs’ 
political activities. Also, HCWs’ presence at hospitals was carefully monitored.
HCWs treated injured anti-government protestors and, because of the 
protestors’ fear of being caught in state hospitals, secret field hospitals 
started to emerge in locations such as schools or mosques. Some of the 
HCWs were called in for home visits.
Those HCWs who were helping demonstrators or supporting the field 
hospitals were under constant threat of being arrested by the GoS. In some 
cases, colleagues disappeared or were detained and were sometimes found 
dead with marks of severe abuse.
We lost a lot of our colleagues. There was a doctor [name retracted]. They 
kidnapped him. After 15 days we saw his body and his eyes were taken off. There 
were other doctors that were killed under detention. (participant 15)
Those imprisoned were held from a few days up to nine months. They 
were questioned and occasionally tortured. They witnessed the torture of 
other prisoners and their inhumane conditions. Those who spent an 
extended period in jail were in poor condition when released.
I have seen people been killed, injured. I witnessed death of almost eight 
people. People got crazy or died or go from craziness to death. This was the most 
difficult experience of my life. I wasn´t tortured. But I was beaten. We were 97 
people in a one 22 m2. We could not go to toilet. There was no food, no medicine. 
I lost 13 kilos. I saw death. I was about to die. (participant 14)
3.3.2 Health care facilities and ambulances
As the conflict escalated, the interviewees had to move to opposition- 
controlled areas to escape the GoS persecution. Still, they gained little respite. 
A new type of danger to health care emerged: the GoS started airstrikes using 
mostly barrel and cluster bombs. Participants described how some violence 
against health care facilities was already present before opposition areas were 
established but such events were reported to be mostly against hidden field 
hospitals. Assaults against secret field hospitals were carried out using mortars, 
shelling and missiles. The participants considered the GoS to be responsible for 
these actions; however, sometimes, the perpetrator remained unknown.
We started a field hospital in [name retracted] mosque. We were targeted by 
helicopters and missiles three times after 20 days. (participant 18)
Participants described the year 2014 as the barrel bomb period in Aleppo. 
Barrel bombs are unguided bombs that, by their nature, are inaccurate. 
Despite or because of this inaccuracy, there were incidents in which barrel 
bombs struck health care facilities. Some strikes were described as having 
been conducted on purpose; some were described as accidental. In 
September 2015 the GoR entered the conflict and brought in more accurate 
weapons. Participants described airstrikes as more intense and deadlier. They 
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mentioned that well-known hospitals were damaged or destroyed and not 
only colleagues, but also patients were killed.
We call the regime [the GoS] aeroplanes or choppers clumsy or stupid aircraft. 
They cannot target directly. But the Russians really can target the hospitals. That’s 
why we lost [name retracted] hospital, lost a couple of medical points in [name of the 
place retracted]. The third hospital was targeted two days ago from the Russians. 
(participant 15)
According to the participants, the health care facilities included both well- 
known, long-established public hospitals and hidden field hospitals. The inter-
viewees believed that the location of official hospitals was known to the GoS 
and the GoR. Covert field hospitals were located in buildings such as schools or 
mosques. The residents living near field hospitals were opposed to them 
because they were afraid that their presence would attract more airstrikes. It 
was believed that the locations of these targets were known to the GoS or 
identified during combat and then purposefully attacked, although this cannot 
be confirmed beyond doubt. Participants mentioned that other civilian infra-
structure such as schools, mosques and water stations were bombed.
We were working in a [name retracted] mosque. We were doing it as a civil 
hospital, but secretly because no-one should know about it, because it may be 
destroyed immediately. The injured people were coming to it every day. It was 
famous, and it was known by all people, all neighbours. Maybe someone told the 
government that there is a civil hospital here in this mosque, so it was destroyed 
in an airstrike. (participant 17)
Airstrikes caused significant loss of human life and varying degrees of 
structural damage to buildings. Fear of more damaging strikes forced the 
evacuation of facilities to other places and necessitated moving underground 
where possible, according to the interviewees. Even if the airstrike missed the 
facility or caused only minor damage, the risk of structural weakening and 
potential collapse had to be taken into account. Similarly, undetonated 
bombs forced the HCWs to evacuate the facility.
After 3rd attack [airstrike] the building is very fragile. If another attack 
happens, even it is near to hospital, it may collapse. We are moving in about 
a month to another hospital. It is close to the area. (participant 15)
Participants considered airstrikes to be the main threat to health care. They 
named the GoS and the GoR as responsible for the airstrikes against health 
care facilities. No participant indicated that the Global Coalition Against 
Daesh had conducted airstrikes in NSAG-controlled areas or Kurdish territory. 
They, however, mentioned strikes in IS-controlled areas but had not person-
ally experienced them. Some participants thought that without airstrikes, life 
could be almost normal in NSAG-controlled areas.
The air strikes are 90% of the problems. For example, one city inside Syria, 
when air strikes stopped, only for two, three weeks, you see the life is coming 
again. People start buying and selling homes, cars, and a market will come 
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again. It will be normal, if there is no air strike in specific area, the life will come 
again. (participant 3)
Health care facilities were not the only ones targeted; ambulances were 
attacked both from the ground and the air causing loss of human life. Some 
participants described double-tap attacks. These consisted of an initial strike on 
a target and a secondary bombing after the rescuers had arrived, thus also killing 
the rescuers. The ambulances were also used for non-medical purposes.
In [name retracted] neighbourhood bombs were thrown at the building and 
destroyed. When the civil defence and ambulances went to the place, I was 
a health worker I was going to the site and I saw how another aircraft targeted 
people by missile. (participant 24)
3.4 Targeted violence against health care by non-governmental actors
The conflict in Syria gradually fragmented into territories under different 
warring parties: NSAGs, IS and Kurdish forces. Participants described the 
situation as chaotic, especially in Aleppo governorate, because of the pre-
sence of these many different factions.
In 2013 Syria started to be divided. In 2014 the radicals came. Then [Syria] was 
more divided. Then the Kurds came and was more divided. Then ISIS started, and 
now it’s chaos. Total chaos. (participant 15)
3.4.1 Non-state armed groups
Living and working under NSAGs control was challenging not only because of 
the airstrikes but also because of war-induced chaos and the resulting power 
vacuum, which the NSAGs exploited. Some participants described the atmo-
sphere as chaotic and unsafe.
It’s the tension all over. There is a complete security vacuum in these areas. 
Anyone can come to threaten or blame you for something. Anyone can bring 
a patient if he is wounded and just put the gun to your forehead and say ‘heal 
him.’ (participant 24)
The attitude towards NSAGs was two-fold: Some participants considered 
them to be a threat while others tolerated them. NSAGs saw HCWs as an 
opportunity for monetary gain. Wealthy people, including physicians, were 
kidnapped for ransom. Participants described how some groups took them to 
the front line to provide medical services for wounded fighters.
Some armed groups kidnapped [HCWs] and asked ransoms. Also, [one of NSAGs] 
tried to force them to serve in the frontline. They tried to kidnap one doctor in front of 
the hospital, but there were people who came to prevent this. (participant 24)
Some participants mentioned that NSAGs were involved in acts of arbitrary 
violence, including arrests, kidnapping and torture. Despite this, participants 
recounted only one incident in which a HCW was killed by a NSAG.
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Jabhat al-Nusra kidnapped two of our workers. We went to their Sharia court. It 
was direct threat against us [as an institution], but not personal. (participant 1)
While some participants viewed NSAGs negatively, others accepted their 
actions. Some participants said that HCWs were respected as a valuable 
resource by the NSAGs. For example, among the different NSAGs, JaN/JFS 
was considered to be a pragmatic organization as HCWs were able to negoti-
ate practical arrangements with the group.
They respect the doctors that are the only resource that take their treatment. 
They need doctors so much, so they respect us. (participant 16)
The NSAGs were Islamist according to some interviewees. Radical Islamists 
groups such as JFS/JaN/HTS focused on ensuring that HCWs observed reli-
gious norms. Some groups interfered with the administering of health care 
for religious reasons.
They [JaN] don’t have a problem with us. As long as we are providing services. But 
because they are radicals, they are always focusing upon there are no females with 
males in the same area. That’s the only thing that they are focusing upon. But they 
[Islamistic NSAGs] don’t really interfere with our work. (participant 23)
3.4.2 Islamic state
Some participants described conditions in IS-controlled areas. At the time of the 
interviews, none of the participants were visiting or working in IS-controlled areas. 
HCWs had been threatened, arrested, kidnapped, or killed by the IS. The organiza-
tion not only targeted HCWs but other people with higher education or politically 
sensitive professions, such as journalists, were also under threat. All participants 
viewed the IS negatively, with great reservation and trepidation.
They [IS] arrested me. They put a knife on my throat. Those seven hours that they 
interrogated me was the moment that changed my life. [After being released] People 
in Raqqa said that this time we got free, next time we won´t. (participant 11)
As the IS gained power and territory, further problems with health care 
providers started to emerge. Some participants noted the destruction of 
medical facilities and ambulances as well as the theft of medical equipment. 
IS forced clinics to close, causing INGOs to withdraw from many areas, thus 
halting the provision of medical aid. Some HCWs found IS so intimidating that 
they chose to leave areas where the organization was present or, in some 
cases, cease operations in Syria completely.
Beginning of 2015 IS started making problems for all INGOs working in this 
area. They closed everything, took everything, all the medical equipment. It was 
very easy for them; they came in and took everything and closed [clinic]. They 
even arrested some people. (participant 22)
3.4.3 Kurdish forces
Only a few participants mentioned violence by the Kurdish forces. HCWs were 
arrested in Kurdish-controlled areas, leaving them unwilling to work again.
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It was arresting our medical personnel. Closing the health care facilities 
but not the hospital. They were arrested because they are working in health sector . . . 
After this incidence, [services] continued. You know how it will be after releasing 
people from jail . . . they killed their motivation to work. (participant 3)
Ambulances were shot at on Castello Road which connects Aleppo to 
Turkey. Those participants who experienced it considered the Kurdish 
Forces were behind the attack. However, it remains unknown whether the 
Kurdish Forces shot at the ambulances on purpose.
3.5 Health care workers´ political role
Some participants described how when the demonstrations started and 
spread across the country, they and their co-workers supported and partici-
pated in the protests. Like the other demonstrators, they were dissatisfied 
with the GoS and President Bashar al-Assad. Some participants not only 
participated in the demonstrations but also had an active role in organizing 
protests in secret groups, for example at the universities. Other political anti- 
government activities were also described, such as speaking publicly against 
the GoS and attending political meetings. Some participants were found and 
arrested because of their actions.
Some doctors from our groups were arrested. For example, [security forces] 
came to ask one doctor who wrote to the wall ‘down Iranian dog’ [refer to 
President al-Assad]. (participant 11)
HCWs were suspected to be part of NSAGs. They were stopped at check-
points and inspected by all warring parties when trying to cross battle lines.
[Security forces] stopped us at checkpoints in Deir Ez-Zour. We had to get out 
of the car and give ID. If they noticed that we were doctors, they made a full- 
scale inspection. They asked in what hospital we are working, are we treating 
fighters. (participant 11)
Some participants denied any connection to NSAGs and expressed nega-
tive opinions about them. They did not consider their work as health care 
providers counted as supporting the NSAGs. However, some participants 
recounted how they were treating injured FSA fighters as well as civilians.
The judge asked if I have any connections to militias. I am totally against. I am 
not linked to any militia, and if you are accusing me of delivering aid, I don´t see 
this as a charge because I am against it. I have never done to support the 
militias. I am not convinced of their movements. I think that the uprising was 
hijacked by militias. Then things went upside-down. Their agendas are not fine. 
(participant 16)
According to those who had been in jail, people were imprisoned for two 
different reasons: for participating in demonstrations and for treating injured 
protestors. While in prison, the officials of the GoS questioned HCWs about 
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their work, colleagues and the location of field hospitals. Also, connections to 
NSAGs were investigated.
The air force intelligence arrested me because I tried to help the injured 
[protestors]. I stayed for six months in jail. The first main reason was because 
I treated demonstrators and second because I participated in demonstrations. 
They asked about doctors in field hospitals, those who were treating injured 
people. Those under the FSA. (participant 1)
4. Discussion
In this research, we focused on intentional violence against health care. The 
findings are based on the perspectives of HCWs who had been working in Syria 
from 2011 to 2017. The study indicates that violence against HCWs started 
immediately in 2011 when demonstrations were met with violence by the GoS.
During the first years of the conflict, violence consisted of threats, torture and 
execution by the GoS. Anyone opposing the GoS and its policies was at risk of 
being imprisoned. The GoS effectively criminalized giving medical aid to injured 
demonstrators. Belonging to NSAGs is punishable according to Syrian law 
(Human Rights Council 2013). HCWs found providing any medical aid to demon-
strators might be considered to be helping terrorists and therefore they would be 
considered terrorists themselves. It appears that the detention of HCWs was due 
to the fact that they were assisting injured demonstrators or had anti-state 
opinions. Notably, the GoS had been authoritarian even before the conflict. 
Human rights, such as freedom of speech, were limited. Attacking HCWs who 
had assisted injured demonstrators or expressed their anti-government views 
was just an extension of GoS pre-war policies.
As the conflict evolved, the GoS continued ground-based violence against 
HCWs but also started airstrikes against civilian infrastructure, including 
health care facilities. The severity of violence reached a peak when the GoR 
joined the war in September 2015. In June 2016 alone, 18 attacks took place 
against health care facilities, including many well-known hospitals in NSAG- 
controlled areas (Physicians for Human Rights 2020).
All parties have committed targeted violence against health care but the 
scale and scope of violence vary. The GoS and the GoR were the foremost 
perpetrators of violence. This is in accordance with many reports and studies 
(Fouad et al. 2018; Physicians for Human Rights 2019; Security Council 2016; 
Wong and Chen 2018). HCWs also experienced targeted violence by IS, NSAGs 
and the Kurdish Forces when Syria fragmented between these different 
factions and lines of battle were formed.
As indicated in previous studies, the working conditions of HCWs were 
terrible outside of the GoS-controlled areas (Footer et al. 2018; Fardousi, 
Douedari, and Howard 2019). IS posed a great threat to the HCWs. Working 
or delivering aid to IS-controlled areas was considered to be very difficult or 
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even impossible. To protect HCWs, humanitarian organizations chose to 
withdraw from areas controlled by the organization. Working conditions for 
HCWs in the IS-declared caliphate have been described in a study carried out 
in Mosul, Iraq (Michlig et al. 2019). Our findings confirm and underline the 
horrors that HCWs have experienced under IS control.
Overall NSAGs have committed less severe forms of violence than IS, such as 
threatening and arresting HCWs. Participants reported an execution carried out 
by NSAGs. Other sources have also reported abuse and killings (Amnesty 
International 2015). The Kurdish Forces were mentioned as perpetrators of vio-
lence only a few times and only in one case was violence intentional. However, in 
the literature the Kurdish Forces are known for atrocities against civilians, viola-
tions of human rights and abuses (Human Rights Watch 2014; Human Rights 
Council 2017). The Global Coalition against Daesh have targeted infrastructure to 
a disproportionate degree considering its impact on the civilian population. 
(Human Rights Council 2017; Amnesty International 2019). However, the inter-
viewees had experienced no violence on the part of the coalition.
Many HCWs felt that they were in a challenging position and that it was 
not safe anywhere. The violence against HCWs has led to a situation where 
professionals have decided to leave Syria (Baker 2014; Cousins 2014) leaving 
the Syrian population without adequate health care. Morbidity and mortality 
have risen among the population (Blanchet et al. 2016).
Fouad et al. (2018) suggest that health care has been weaponized; health 
care has been targeted deliberately and depriving people of health services is 
used as a strategy of war. Several reports and studies state that the bombing 
of hospitals and ambulances shows patterns that indicate intent (World 
Health Organization 2016b; Haar et al. 2018; Ri et al. 2019; Elamein et al. 
2017b; Fouad et al. 2018; Physicians for Human Rights 2020).
Our interviews indicate that other relevant infrastructure such as schools, 
water stations and mosques has also been destroyed. This is in agreement 
with several reports (Human Rights Watch 2019; Global Coalition to Protect 
Education from Attack 2018; Human Rights Watch 2020). We propose that the 
phenomenon of alleged intentional targeting of health care by airstrikes 
should be considered in a broader context. It is most likely that attacks are 
made intentionally against health care. However, they may also be part of 
a larger-scale strategy to destroy non-military infrastructure.
Based on our interviews, it is uncertain whether targeting health care facilities 
was initially planned or merely collateral damage due to a lack of precision 
weapons. GoS and GoR were initially informed of the location of official health 
care facilities, while the locations of unofficial field hospitals were not reported. 
On the other hand, had there been a coordinated campaign to attack these 
facilities, it is unlikely that any would have escaped total obliteration. The evi-
dence doesn’t seem to support this either. The most likely theory appears to be 
that some attacks were intentional or at least little attention was paid by the GoS 
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to protecting these buildings from damage. If health care facilities were damaged 
due to indiscriminate attacks this is also a violation of the Geneva Conventions.
4.1 Limitations
Our study has limitations, especially concerning data collection. It was limited to 
HCWs in NSAG-controlled and Kurdish-held areas, geographically mostly in north-
ern Syria. We obtained some information from the IS-controlled regions. We 
acknowledge that HCWs in the GoS controlled areas face challenges but collect-
ing more detailed information concerning their situation was not within the 
scope of this study.
The SSM can be criticized because the participants were not selected randomly 
creating the possibility of selection bias (Kaplan, Korf, and Sterk 1987). To reduce 
this, we used three parallel SSM networks. Notably less women than men were 
interviewed. This is mostly due to the fact that male participants named other 
men as further contacts. Experiences of women HCWs and gender-based violence 
should be studied in more detail in follow-up studies.
In analysing the data, the participants’ strong personal sentiments have to 
be taken into account. Interviewees may over-emphasize their viewpoints. 
Practically all participants were opposed to the GoS. Many had actively 
participated in non-violent anti-government actions, such as participating 
in or even organizing demonstrations. It remains unknown if any were 
supporters or members of the NSAGs or had participated in armed combat.
Traumatic experiences as well as personal opinions may influence the 
objectivity of the narrative. We countered this effect by placing most value 
on information received from several individual and unrelated participants.
4.2 Strengths
This study also has notable strengths. Collecting data and finding volunteers to 
interview in conflict settings is challenging due to the sensitivity of the subject 
matter. Through a qualitative study with semi-structured interviews, it is possible 
to obtain information that reflects the reasons and chains of events leading up to 
the acts of violence against health care workers. It seems that less severe forms of 
harassment, such as verbal threatening, may not even be considered as violence 
by the victims. Such events often go unreported. However, we consider that such 
forms of less severe violence can have a substantial impact on HCWs’ psycholo-
gical well-being and on their decision to leave the country.
5. Conclusion
This study contributes to the limited literature on the personal experiences of 
violence against health care in the Syrian conflict. This research gives a voice 
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to those who worked in the midst of war. Violence against health care work-
ers and health care facilities disrespects medical neutrality and under certain 
circumstances can constitute a war crime.
The results of this study indicate that the goals and actions of all the armed 
factions active in the Syrian conflict should be studied to fully appreciate the 
mechanisms of violence against health care. While preventing high-profile 
military action such as airstrikes against health care facilities is primarily an 
international political challenge, it is likely that significant positive results 
could be reached by influencing the actions of ground-based actors such as IS 
and JaN.
Examining violence in Syria more comprehensively on all levels, from 
individual to the large-scale political, would allow the construction of addi-
tional models and more effective intervention and protection guidelines for 
health care in conflict scenarios. Drawing from the experiences of HCWs, 
a better understanding of the structure of intentional violence may enable 
the international community to find better solutions to protect health care in 
the future. In particular hands-on practical-level methods of intervention 
merit further research.
Health care facilities, among other civilian infrastructure, must be safe-
guarded. It is paramount to continue to research anti-health care violence, 
not only in Syria but in all countries that are experiencing armed conflict. It is 
feasible to hypothesize that events in Syria foreshadow a growing trend in 
which health care is an increasingly strategic resource and viewed as a valid 
target of war. In the eye of the conflict, well-functioning health care is vital for 
the civilians. One participant put it well when they said:
When hospitals are destroyed, there will be no life. Anyone can live without 
food for a month, but if there is a bleeding artery, he can’t live for more than ten 
minutes. (participant 16)
Notes
1. see for example Wong and Chen (2018); Elamein et al. (2017a).
2. see Footer et al. (2018); Fardousi, Douedari, and Howard (2019).
3. previously also known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham – JFS, currently known as Hay’at 
Tahrir al-Sham – HTS.
4. Daesh is an Arabic acronym from intitial letters of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa 
al-Sham, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
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Appendix I: Classifications and Lists Used
Class Type
Objects Health care workers (HCWs): 
health professionals, health associate professionals, health 
management and support personnel
Health care facilities: 
public and private hospitals, clinics and field hospitals
Ambulances: 
marked transports









Perpetrators The Government of Syria (GoS) and allies
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs)
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Islamic State in Syria (IS)
Results of attacks Material damage: damage to structures of health care 
facilities
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